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Made in Pakistan: Manufacturing and Distribution of Terror

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Abstract

Terrorism is conceptualized and executed by the Pakistani Military establishment in alliance with its religious allies. This Mullah-Military alliance has associated national identity with invaders of the Indian subcontinent. The Afghan-Soviet war during the Cold War concentrated global jihadi warriors in Pakistan. As the Soviets withdrew their forces, the unemployed jihadi terrorists entered Kashmir. Armed with fabricated stories about the 'conquest of India' prophesied by Muhammad, the jihadis created havoc not only in India's northwest but in Pakistan as well. Military establishment's decision to consider certain terrorist groups as assets and others dangerous to national security miscalculated the ability of terrorists to switch group affiliation guided by self-interest. While Islamabad has made billions during the Cold War Afghan-Soviet conflict and the post-Cold War Afghan-US wars, the region of South Asia has witnessed a carnival of terrorism and the growth in smuggling of drugs and weapons.

Keywords: Islam, Pakistan, Kashmir, Jihad, Terrorism, Arab, Identity, India, Afghanistan.

The Paper focuses on how and why jihadi terror networks of Pakistan have flourished, in general and why have they targeted India, in particular? A nuanced analysis of the terror network requires a careful study of identity formation, invention of traditions, the misinterpretation and misrepresentation of Islamic ideology. In the 1980's, Pakistan became the Mecca of jihadi terrorists with the support of U.S/Arab financial and military assistance. These were the coldest days of the Cold War. Pakistan's Kashmir obsession, however, had started with the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. This fixation guided the establishment to forge links with the jihadi terror networks against India. After two direct wars over Kashmir with India, the Afghan-Soviet war gave Pakistan another opportunity. This time they had the global jihadis as cannon fodder along with domestic holy warriors. Propaganda of NATO and its allies propounded the fight against the Soviets as an anti-atheist struggle of God-fearing people

of the 'free' world. The fight against India was presented as fulfilling an alleged prophecy of 'Ghazva-e-Hind' (the conquest of India) by Prophet Muhammad. The problem of global reach of Pakistani terror network is beyond the scope of this paper, hence the focus is confined to Pakistan's terror network against India. However, Pakistan's role in the regional and global terrorist movements is indispensable for analysis of the context of the jihadi juggernaut on the subcontinent. Originating with Jinnah's advocacy of 'Do Quomi Nazria,' (two nation theory), the foundations of identity and ideology of Pakistan were based on Arab-Islamic values. This construction of non-Indian anti-Hindu identity required invention of traditions based on falsification of history. In religious terms, the Hindu belief system is termed *Kefiran* (infidel). Since the Hindus do not submit to the will of Allah, they deserve eternal hellfire. Although Islamic scholars have contested the extreme interpretation of the Quranic verses like *Kafirun* and Kufr-infidelity (Tabur, 2023), it is the local Mullah who assures the followers to stand victorious because his words and interpretation is powerful and believed. Such methods of indoctrination have helped the expansion of the Pakistani terror networks of Islamic warriors aspiring to martyrdom. Conversely, some terrorist groups like Tehrik-e-Taliban and Islamic State (Khurasan) fighting for Allah have also created a serious domestic problem for the civil society and the state of Pakistan.

Founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, did not mince words in advocating and promoting differences between Hindus and Muslims in his speeches, writings and presentations both during and after the British Raj. "Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, and literary traditions," wrote Jinnah, "they neither intermarry nor eat together, and indeed they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions." (Pillalamarri, 2019). Embracing this dichotomous view, Pakistan's ruling elite plunged into the process of using Islam to build identity, adopt institutional framework of governance and adopt adventurist foreign policy. Thus, Islamization of Pakistan started soon after the partition under Jinnah's leadership. This premise left no room for diversity in the future of Pakistan. Needless to say, the new establishment of Azad Pakistan began the process of building a unique, distinct and anti-Hindu identity for Pakistani Muslims to differentiate them from the people of the subcontinent. Building an exclusive identity was a herculean task given the history of centuries old mutually dependent lives of the people of the Indian subcontinent. During the 1871 census, the British officials noted that "some people mentioned themselves both as Hindus and Muslims simultaneously" (Zahoor and Gujjar, 2019: 58). Contrary to historical experience, the Pakistani establishment began the process of "an imagined political community" with the power of the state. It was an attempt to restructure the identity that was "sovereign and inherently limited" (Anderson, 1983: 6). Ever since the crushing of "the first war of independence" in 1857, the process of religious identity formation had been in motion backed by the full might of the British colonial administration. The "imagined communities" project received an impetus from the census, the print media and modern colonial education introduced by the British. These efforts helped consolidate the ideas of "nation-ness and nationality" among Muslims of the Indian subcontinent that were "cultural artifacts of a particular kind" (Anderson, 1983: 4).

Urdu was presented as the lingua franca of Muslims of the subcontinent. After 1947, it was imposed on both East and West Pakistan to create national 'unity'. The rejection of this unity panacea by the Bengali population of East Pakistan, however, divided the new state into two sovereign countries. The emergence of independent Bangladesh forced a new project of inventing "common traditions" for West Pakistan. Identity issue or sense of belonging has produced multiple theoretical approaches. The primordial approach holds that identities are deep-rooted and unchangeable like religion. Constructivism, on the other hand, holds that the ideas and values of the dominant power blocs play a role in shaping a sense of belonging. Scholars argue that evidence shows that there is nothing natural about these ties and there is "stronger evidence that they are socially constructed" (Eller and Coughlan, 1993: 183). The social construction of identities requires invention of traditions. Eric Hobsbawm believed that traditions, which are claimed historical and old, are often new, invented, constructed, and instituted (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 2014: 1). The invention of traditions in the case of Pakistan required falsification of history and construction of fables. Analyzing history textbooks of Pakistan, a scholar called this project a murder of history (Aziz, 1985). He argues that the history textbooks of Pakistan misrepresented the past to foster a nationalist agenda of the state which justified the creation of Pakistan. His study also illuminated how textbooks presented the Muslim conquest of the Indian subcontinent as moral and heroic? Same episodes are viewed in India as violent invasions which were barbaric and destructive. The Pakistani perspective is advanced to promote political jihadi elements within Islam. Same textbook agenda became Pakistan studies and social studies under General Zia-ul-Haq. Based on his scholarly research, author of *The Murder of History* challenged the distorted and falsified narrative of history propagated as the official ideology of the state (Aziz, 1985).

This approach of Pakistani establishment also presents Hindus as cowards, unethical, and disbelievers. It is done to promote hatred that fosters indifference. Studies compiled by the authors focusing on cases of human extermination highlight the role of propaganda based on falsification in creating an atmosphere of violence against the enemy (*Holocaust Encyclopedia,* 1993). Textbook propaganda of Pakistan presents Hindus as inferior because they were defeated and subjugated while Pakistani Muslim ancestry is from the brave conquerors. The basic role of such propaganda is to overcome the hurdle to the mass elimination of Hindus as advocated by the jihadis in case these non-believers refuse to convert. A study focuses on how feelings of superiority, something that happens inside people's heads, "can come to conceive of other human beings as subhuman creatures" (Smith, 2021: 9). It leads to clashes between different cultures or what Huntington called the clash of civilizations. Huntington presented civilizations in religious terms when he wrote that "to a very large degree, the major civilizations in human history have been closely identified with the world's great religions" (Huntington, 1988). The clash, he suggests, is both between nations and within the nations between two groups representing different civilizations. Since Pakistan has appointed itself as the representative of a pure Islamic civilization, it has resorted to "free" the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent. The adoption of senseless violence to promote Islamic agenda supports Huntington's assumption that Islam has bloody borders and Islamic Civilization is prone to conflict (Huntington,

1998). Observing Pakistani role in promoting terror in Indian Kashmir, Stern writes that "Pakistani militant groups are killing civilians and engaging in terrorism in Indian-held Kashmir under the guise of holy war" (Stern, 2000: 115).

Who are we?

In pre-partitioned India, Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League's efforts to create a unique and exclusive Muslim identity were confined to differentiate it from the Hindus of the subcontinent. The Pakistanis were still Indian ethnics, the unity of Muslim Ummah of East Pakistan and West Pakistan rested on two pillars- the Islam and Urdu language. As Urdu became problematic for national unity, the major project of the new state came at a crossroad. The state violence to suppress Bengali nationalism gave birth to a new nation. After the creation of Bangladesh, in general, and the rise of General Zia-ul-Haq, in particular, the dialogue and debate on national identity became more complicated because the Pakistani state started the pursuit of an agenda to Arabize the education sector and recast the country into an Arab state. The marauders became the new rock stars. The narrative promoted the 8th century Arab invader Mohammad bin Qassim as the nation's 'first citizen'. The Arab connection of Pakistani identity had its roots in the propaganda unleashed by the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). The JI has been organizing '*Yaum Babul Islam'* (harbinger of Islam) event to commemorate the advent of Islam in the subcontinent when the party celebrates the conquest of Sindh by the Arab commander Mohammad bin Qassim on the orders of Umayyad Caliph. The JI was originally opposed to Mohammad Ali Jinnah, finally they found the first Pakistani. The youth are urged to become new Mohammad bin Qassims, who is said to have 'liberated' the people of Sindh from the oppression of cruel Hindu rulers. It is not only for domestic consumption, the idea of an eighth century Arab as the first citizen of Pakistan is also promoted internationally. Muhammad bin Qassim took over the position of Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah. Pakistan's Tokyo embassy website describes the nation's past in the eighth century when "its foundation was laid by Muhammad bin Qassim…in 711 A.D" (Pakistan Embassy Tokyo, n.d). The admirers of this great Islamic warrior also believe that Pakistan was lucky to receive the word of God through Caliph's messenger. A University of Chicago study cited an op-ed from an Urdu daily Jang: "Russia, China, Philippine [sic], Korea and Ceylon etc. are our neighboring countries. However, they are still swathed in the darkness of unbelief while Pakistan exists in the name of Islam. Why is that? The answer is clear that those countries did not have a true Mujahid of Islam such as Muhammad bin Qassim enter triumphantly with the message of Islam." (Manan, 2008: 5) During the Afghan-Soviet war, the attempt to imitate the Arabs brought billions of Petrodollars along with Wahabi Madrasas and Muslim leaders like Osama bin Laden to mold the younger generation of Islamic holy fighters and create new Mohammad bin Qassims. This Arab project was an attempt to show that Pakistan is "a country with different cultural identity" (Hussain, 2020).

The first modern story of Mohammad bin Qassim appeared in James Mill's *The History of British India* first published in 1818. He divided Indian history in three parts: Ancient Hindu India, medieval Muslim India and

modern British India. Like other Orientalists, Mill presented India as chaotic and helpless, its society stagnant and unchangeable; whatever little it had achieved was destroyed by the Muslim invaders much like the Muslim Arabs had destroyed classical Europe. In India, the destruction of Hindu civilization was followed by the dark period of Islamic rule until the British East India Company came to India to reform it through modernization (Mill, 2010). The East India Company official James Mill also started the narrative of permanent hostility between invader Muslims and indigenous Hindus of India. The Pakistani state's claim of Arab ancestry surprisingly supports Mill's narrative of Muslims as foreigners and invaders in Hindu native India. Some studies, however, show that most Muslims of the Indian subcontinent are Hindu converts. The foreign origin fables are the figment of imagination of Pakistani establishment of Islamabad where logic has taken a long vacation. The marauders like Timur, Nadir Shah, and Ahmed Shah Abdali were responsible for plunder and destruction of India. The Sultanate and the Mughal rulers lavishly enjoyed the material luxuries provided to them by power and wealth in India.

Spread of Islam in the subcontinent has attracted a wide-range of scholarship. Many historians believe that Muslim conquerors forced locals to embrace Islam with sword. Forced conversions are ordained by the Quran: "Kill the polytheists wherever you find them, and besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every ambush (Quran, 2017:77). Islamic scholars also believe that "many Hindu commoners superficially embraced Islam only to get out of the rigid caste system that Indian society laid out" (Habib, 1961: 47). The ruling Islamic dynasties of Delhi also used Jaziya on Hindus to complete the task. In fact, the dictate to use tax comes from the Quran: "Fight those who do not believe in God nor in the Last Day, nor forbid what God and His Messenger have forbidden, nor abide by the religion of truth- from among those who receive the Scripture- until they pay the due tax, willingly or unwillingly (Quran, 2017: 78). More than a financial burden, the methods used to collect Jiziya may have speeded conversions. Salman Rashid cites the Turkish sources to reveal that "jiziya collectors would spit in the mouth of Hindus thus forcing even upper castes to convert to Islam" (2022).

The Rawalpindi establishment also promotes the idea of Islam's dissemination in the Indian subcontinent through the sword of brave men like Mohammad bin Qassim. It supports the theory that all Muslims of India are conquerors and colonizers and how brave Muslims subdued coward Hindus to spread Islam? Many liberal historians and scholars have emphasized the role of Sufis like Baba Farid of Punjab, his disciple Nizzamuddin Auliya of Delhi and others beside the role of Arab traders in the spread of Islam on the Indian subcontinent. This theory of mercantile and spiritual migrants emphasizes the settlement and migration patterns of traders and Sufis. As a matter of fact, the traders built the first mosque in Kerala in 629 AD. It was completed more than eight decades earlier than the arrival of the 'first citizen' Mohammad bin Qassim (Jamal, 2021). Manan observes that the 'first citizen of Pakistan' left no history. There is no evidence based on epigraphy and inscription. No coins with his name are found until today (Manan, 2008). Person of such significance, who became the 'first citizen' and hero of Pakistan, is not even mentioned in a footnote by any of his contemporary sources. Hundred and thirty years later the first story of Mohammad bin Qassim appears in a book *Kitab Futuh al-Buldan* written by al-Baladhuri. Even

this book of his "character does not distinguish him among many commanders of Muslim armies from the earliest expeditions" (Manan, 2008: 163). After this work, a 13th century Farsi text called *Chachnama* mentions Qassim story in more details. In order to give legitimacy of Islamic tradition, the book is presented as a Farsi translation of Arabic text about the great Muslim conquest of the subcontinent. Columbia University Professor Manan Ahmed Asif's research has shown that it is neither a translation nor about the great conquest. The book is simply a political theory text in the same tradition as *Arthshastra* and *Panchatantra* (Asif, 2016).

The question arises, why did General Zia-ul-Haq promote this Arab commander from the eighth century? Even in Pakistan, the first mention of Mohammad bin Qassim is in school texts published in 1953 to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the founding of the new state. More than four and half decades later a Federal Bureau of Pakistan publication of 1998 to mark the 50th anniversary of the new nation, Qassim is mentioned as "the first citizen" (Pracha, 2015). After that this 8th century figure became a historic celebrity in Pakistan. At one time in Pakistan, it became fashionable for middle class families to have their children take pictures in the imagined costumes of General Mohammad bin Qassim. The view of Sindhi nationalists, however, is different on 'the first citizen'. For them Hindu Raja Dahir Sen, who fought the Arab invaders, is still a hero. They have passionately disagreed with the narrative of the Pakistani state. They describe this as a hegemonic project of the Punjabi army in the name of Islam. Although comparatively peaceful, they demonstrated their disdain for the imposition of foreign heroes in the name of Islam to replace Sindhi traditions. They have also raised voices against the falsification of Sindh's history, which they claim is far more ancient than Islam.

As the government of Pakistan had relied on Islam and Urdu as cornerstones of the new nation, the linguistic nationalisms of subunits defended their regional languages with passion. Sindhi nationalists also did not appreciate the replacement of their regional language. First violent reaction to Urdu, however, appeared in East Pakistan among the Bengali population. The Bengalis led the opposition to Urdu and paid a heavy price. The coercive apparatus of the state did not pay any attention to the debates, dialogues and discussions on the 'national' language. In other words, the problem for the establishment's hegemony was not simply a relationship between consent and coercion but rather it was a question of the formation of consent and the role of coercion (Gramsci, 1971). Urdu was not the language of any province of Pakistan. After Urdu was declared the national language of Pakistan, shocked Members of Parliament from East Pakistan demanded that the members should be allowed to speak Bangla on the assembly floor (Ahmed, 2021). They were also surprised why Bengali, which was the majority language of Pakistan, was not declared the national language or one of the national languages? Prime Minister Liaquat Ali angrily opposed the suggestion and advocated the use of Urdu for the sake of national unity. Aspirations and dreams of all nationalities of Pakistan to advance their own languages in education and official work were crushed by the imposition of an alien language. It was spoken only by the *Muhajirs* who had migrated from northern and central India to Pakistan. Governor-General Mohammad Ali Jinnah went to address a special convocation of Dhaka University in 1948 to make it clear to restive Bengali students and faculty that Urdu and Urdu alone would be the

language of the state (Ahsan, 2020). At the time of Jinnah's speech, language composition of Pakistani society gave numerical advantage to Bengali with 54.6% speakers, while Punjabi speakers were 28.4%, Pashto speakers represented 7%, Urdu speakers at 7.2% were only slightly higher than Pashto while Sindhi with 5.8% and Baloch with 1.4% were the only two other groups smaller than Urdu speakers (Purewal, 2024). It started peacefully but the coercive apparatus fomented violence. The state terrorism started with bullets in 1952 to silence this linguistic nationalism of East Pakistan. As the state became more violent, the clashes led to the genocide of the Bengalis in East Pakistan. India's intervention to stop the inflow of refugees ended in General Niazi's surrender of 93,000 Pakistani troops. Along with linguistic chauvinism, West Pakistan found it hard to digest the numerical strength of East Pakistan demonstrated in electoral politics. It countered this with the creation of One-Unit of West Pakistan by combining Balochistan, Punjab, NWFP (North West Frontier Provinces) and Sindh. The units were unhappy to lose provincial jurisdictions and the imposition of Urdu except the Punjabi establishment. Rawalpindi establishment adopted Urdu to present themselves as national unity champions who have sacrificed their mother tongue for the noble cause (Purewal, 2024). Institutional decay started with language controversy in 1948 followed by the dismantling of federalism in 1955 and ended with the evisceration of democracy in the military coup of 1958.

Sindhi pride in their own history, culture and language was also a challenge for the Pakistani establishment. The new slavery in the name of Islam and Urdu was viewed as the hegemony of the Punjab which became unacceptable to Sindhis. One could find pamphlets and CDs in Sindh cities praising their own hero Sindhi Hindu Raja Dahir, not Mohammad bin Qassim. Undoubtedly, they are critical of Arbs who destroyed the harmonious society of Sindh. Needless to say, Sindhi view clearly saw the state of Pakistan behaving like invaders and it was "seen awash in military dictatorships, religious extremism, and Punjabi/Urdu domination" (Manan, 2008). In 1972, Sindhi nationalism became more vocal and uncompromising with the founding of Jeay Sindh Tehreek. The idea of one unit was abandoned in 1970. It was the formation of Bangladesh that forced the government to adopt reforms *albeit* for public relations. A new constitution was adopted in 1973 to replace the 1962 constitution. Despite these steps, the nation remained at the crossroads. The new constitution gave the provinces the right to choose their mother tongues for education and official work. Known as the Islamic constitution, it also gave a directly elected Parliament with a bicameral system rooted in federalism. The definition of Muslim, however, became narrower when it declared that the Ahmadis are non-Muslims. The blasphemy laws became more harsher with emphasis that all laws must conform to the Quran and the Sunna.

The Pakistani state was taking one step forward, two steps back. The new constitution gave regions a chance to adopt local languages in the field of education and official provincial work. It was a guarded reaction to historic events related with imposition of Urdu, which had first appeared in East Pakistan. The constitutional declaration that the Ahmadiyya community is not Islamic surprised most observers. It is ironic that before 1947 partition of the Punjab, the case of Muslims before the Punjab Boundary Commission was presented by a leading member of

the Ahmadiyya community- Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan (Ahmed, 2011: 702). The constitution of 1973 made him a non-Muslim. Founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmed in Qadian (India) in 1889, he claimed to be the reformer-the Mehdi (the Prophet). Apparently, they are just one of seventy-three sects of Islam (Raja, 2020: 765). A hadith is often cited that says the Prophet had predicted 73 sects of Islam. All sects claim that their sect is 'saved one' and their followers will be in Paradise while the rest will be in hell (Khaki, 2013). The Ahmadiyya community officially became the target of hate and persecution in Sunni majority Pakistan. The attempt to adopt Arab identity also came with Wahabi Sunni ideology directed against the Shia population. According to *International Religious Freedom Report*, the worst religious violence is directed against the country's Shia population minority with 15-20 percent (IRB, 2024). Acts of violence against the Shia minority increase during the month of Muharram when they commemorate the death of Hussein in the first month of the Islamic calendar. The founder of Pakistan Muhammad Ali Jinnah belonged to the Shia population (Agha Khan Ismaili sect). It is still debated why after his death namaz-e-janaja in public was performed with Sunni rituals while his family in privacy performed Shia rituals? Sectarian divisions within Islam have been a source of conflict in the middle east and other Muslim countries. Since the Pakistani establishment uses both Islam and terrorism for strategic goals of the state, the sectarian divisions surfaced with the deadly force of terror among the civil population of Pakistan.

In July 2004, the Commission investigating 9/11 concluded in its report that the current faced by the U.S. is not terrorism, some generic evil, but rather "Islamist terrorism inspired by a long tradition of extreme intolerance within one extreme of Islam that flows through the founder of Wahhabism, the Muslim brotherhood and prominent thinkers schooled in Salafi tradition" (PRC, 2005). This exerted a great pressure on Arab states to change and most of them chose the path of reforms to rescue Islam from the extremists. As they started adopting modest religious traditions without bigotry and bloodshed, societies started moving in a more progressive and tolerable direction. Under Saudi Prince Muhammad Bin Salman (MBS), for example, women have been allowed to drive, co-education has surfaced, movie theaters are open and all-night parties of men and women dancing together have become normal. MBS defended all this by saying that "we are returning to what we were before, a country of moderate Islam that is open to all religions, traditions and people around the world" (El-Hadi, 2023). All this has shocked the Mullahs in the Middle East and Islamabad. As a result, the Arab project of Pakistani establishment became enigmatic. The problem originates from the prevalence of extreme ideology of Wahhabi Islam led by the Maulvi lobby in the Pakistan. A new trend is transforming the old project of an Arab identity. As the Arab identity is emerging disputable, the Ottoman Turkish identity is a choice because it has historic connections with the subcontinent. This new attempt to invent yet another identity for Pakistan began with soft diplomacy of Erdogan's Islamic Turkey. A Turkish TV series Ertgrul's life, banned in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, gripped Pakistan. It was the project of Prime Minister Imran Khan who urged young Pakistanis to watch the series. Dubbed in Urdu, it became a hit. Professor Pervez Hoodbhoy viewed the Prime Minister's promotion of such foreign programs to fill a void in the cultural vacuum of incomplete identity formation "with characters alien to this land" (Bezhan and Khattak, 2020).

The Turkish identity has the potential to become a challenge for the Pakistani state in search of a foreign identity associated with the invaders. In case Turkey follows a path to rediscover Kamalism, the rational, secular

and progressive roots of Kamal Ataturk. The next search may take the Pakistani establishment to Greek Macedonia associated with another invader- Alexander the Great. Originating from some vague Quranic references to Dhulgarnayan, the "two horned one," the tale has created a Maulvi lobby for the paganist Alexander the Great. Some traditional Islamic fables and Quranic interpretations have also endorsed the identity of Dhulgarnyan as Alexander (Meddings, 2017). Two horns on the head also appear in Michelangelo's Moses and fierce Japanese Samurai helmets; however, Alexander's appeal is far greater for Pakistan because he had invaded India. Until the appearance of a documentary of Alexander's Campaign by Salman Rashid, a travel writer of Pakistan, the narrative was in favor of Alexander's greatness with contempt for Hindu Raja Porus. His role was considered very minor. Sad for the establishment, the social media is full of stories of Pakistani youth who have started to identify with great Porus as the son of the soil (Reddit, n.d.).

Ghazva-e-Hind

Drake states that ideology plays a crucial role in terrorist's target selection, it provides an initial "motive for actions and guides those actions" (Drake, 1998: 53). In order to motivate the Pakistani youth for territorial wars in the name of religion, alleged prophecies attributed to Muhammad are contained in a Hadith predicting the 'battle of India' referred to as Ghazva-e-Hind. Various versions of this Hadith are in circulation to inspire the jihadi warriors for this great battle. A Hadith attributed to Thawban states that the Messenger of Allah promised us that we would invade India and if I live to see that, I will sacrifice myself and my wealth. He further states that If I am killed, I will be one of the best martyrs. If I come back, I will be Abu Hurairah Al-Muharrar- a companion of the Prophet (Haqqani, 2015). The prophecies of Khurasan gained currency during the Afghan wars among jihadi fighters facing the Soviet army (IS-Khurasan is still active with these prophecies). The Ghazva-e-Hind became the clarion call of jihadis like Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Righteous) when Kashmir became the target of the unemployed Islamists after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The prophet died in 632 AD but the written Hadiths, stories of Mohammad's saying, started appearing in 8th and 9th centuries. The forged Hadiths originally started appearing even during Caliphate of Abu Bakr, the first Caliph, a companion and father-in-law of Muhammad. These Hadith forgeries started as conflicts intensified among the power blocs who were asserting and proclaiming domination and rule over the newly established Islamic societies. Each relied on a Hadith advocating a particular stand favoring them. The Hadith scholar Brown writes that heydays of forgeries were the first four centuries after the Prophet's death (Brown, 2024). The first to object to the made-up stories and misinterpretations of Muhammad's sayings was his wife Aisha. As sectarian conflicts increased within Islamic community, so did the forgeries for propaganda purposes. Forgeries also accompanied power shifts from the Arabs to the dominant factions of Turks as the Ottoman rule became hegemonic among Muslim societies. Surprisingly, it has continued well into the late twentieth century. In the last decade of the twentieth century, one Arab scholar claimed to have found an old Hadith which predicted that a leader whose name is derived from the word tree (Bush?) will invade and liberate a small hill fort-Kuwait (Brown, 2024). To combat this tradition of forgeries, Prince MBS has suggested to rely on the wisdom of the Quran and the Sunna which is the Saudi constitution. He has questioned the prevalent interpretations of many Hadiths. A study by Muslim scholars of the Khusro Institute found that the Ghazva-e-Hind is nothing but fabricated fables. The study has concluded that it is merely a pack of lies concocted by Pakistani jihadi leaders backed by the Military establishment (Ramanand, 2024).

Islamic ideological fabrications were required to motivate the youth to become the cannon fodder for Pakistani state. The Mullahs in Madrassas and mosques teach the youth that God rewards the faithful and those who follow his command will enter the paradise. In Jannat (paradise), the faithful will live lavish lives, eat, drink and enjoy the company of women. In 2001, CBS (Columbia Broadcasting System) aired an interview with a Hamas leader who was responsible for recruiting Palestinian youth for suicide bombers in Israel. He told the reporter that I describe the benefits from God for sacrificing life: "God will give you 70 virgins, 70 wives and everlasting happiness" (Warraq, 2001). A Hadith known as the *Sunan-al-Tirmidhi* promises martyrs with 80,000 servants and 72 wives under a Pearl dome (Adams, 2001). Why did the Hamas leader shortchange the martyrs by only promising 70 virgins is a mystery? However, a study based on the Syro-Aramaic reading of the Quran claims that many obscurities of the holy book disappear if we read certain words as being Syriac and not Arabic. Instead of virgins, the promise is chilled raisins with crystal quality (Luxenberg, 2007). Such academic and scholarly interpretations of Islam and Islamic traditions have impacted the Arab statesmen like Prince MBS; the Mullah lobby of Pakistan, however, is neither interested in academia nor any logical interpretations based on reason. They have their own predispositions which serve their narrow interests.

Axis of Terror

The U.S. state department study on Pakistan terrorism states that Pakistan continues to serve as a safe haven for certain regionally focused terrorist groups, like the ones targeting Afghanistan and India (U.S. Department of State, 2019). Groups like the Jaish-e-Muhammad (Army of Muhammad) with their founder Azhhar and leaders like Sajid Mir, who were the masterminds of 2008 Mumbai attacks, not only continue to reside in Pakistan but the state has provided them protection. In *The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan*, an Australian Scholar argues that to make sense of terrorism in Pakistan one must understand its history. He analyzed the disruptive role of partition that impacted everything from infrastructure to culture (Murphy, 2014). The Pakistani state narrative to imagine Islamic community's origin in the subcontinent from the descendants of invaders helps motivate the terrorists. Propaganda of heritage of victors against weaker Hindus are factors that establish an environment in which anti-India terrorism flourishes. The fabrications of theories like Ghazva-e-Hind dispensed promises of paradise to suicidal missions of the holy warriors. Even before Pakistan was born, the Muslim League had adopted terrorist methods for ethnic cleansing to encourage the concentration of the Muslim population in the East and West of India to achieve the bifurcation of the subcontinent. Terror tactics had the objective to cleanse Hindu-Sikh population from Muslim majority areas and expected reprisals against the Muslim population in Hindu-Sikh majority areas.

Post-partition period witnessed terrorist strategy and tactics of the Pakistani establishment in the state of Kashmir followed by Balochistan and the Bengalis of East Pakistan. The first violent aggression began soon after the British withdrawal from the subcontinent when Pakistani *lashkar* (militia) supported by army regulars entered the Kashmir region of India. Shortly after, the Pakistani state attacked and forcefully annexed the sovereign Baloch state. Bengali population was next to face the wrath of West Pakistani military junta. A 1989 study for the US

Congress states that the shooting of students in East Pakistan in 1952 set "a stage for state terrorism" (Heitzman and Worden, 1989). West Pakistan army targeted the Bengali population with murder, rape and other heinous atrocities. A cable among declassified documents of the US diplomats released in 2002 stated that the "West Pakistani forces, commanded by General Yahya and the Martial Law Administrator, Lt. General Tikka Khan began a self-destructive course of repressive actions against their fellow Pakistanis in the East…. The final tally of the dead, as reported by Mujib was approximately three million" (Gandhi, 2002). This brutal and senseless violence combined with hatred and racism of the Rawalpindi establishment were aimed at both the Pakistani people and the neighbor India. Apart from freedoms, equality and the rule of law, the all-round progress and development to meet the spiritual and material needs of the people of Pakistan was seriously lacking. This lack of development left people disengaged and unmotivated. Needless to say, the extreme interpretation and misrepresentation of the Islamic ideology and actions of jihadi groups were required to distract people from the critical issues. State terrorism of the Armed Forces and the divinely inspired words of the Mullahs became the panacea of the establishment for all socio-economic issues of the Pakistani people.

Genocide of Bengali population could not stop their secession from Pakistan. The government of West Pakistan had to show that it has learned lessons from the loss of East Pakistan. As a result, reforms announced in hurry by Prime Minister Zulfikar Bhutto in economic, education, health, industrial, land, labor, and legal domains were more imaginary than real. The biggest was a new constitution adopted in 1973 that came into full effect in August of that year. As the 1973 constitution of Pakistan entrenched Islamic ideology in the state institutions, Pakistan was declared as an Islamic Republic. The Islam also became the official religion of the state. It did not please NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Balochistan along with country's liberal intelligentsia who thought it was catering to orthodox Mullah lobby. Country was moving in the direction of Islamic orthodoxy with entrenched ecclesiastical authority. Under Zia-ul-Haq, the regime took further measures to consolidate the hold of the Wahabi Islam. These initiatives created groundwork for a global sacred place for jihadis. The opportunity was provided by the Soviet army's entry in Afghanistan in December 1979 that triggered a nine years civil war. These events created conditions for Islamabad to become the hub of Islamic terrorism with open encouragement of the Arab/Western powers. For global jihad and state sponsored terrorism, 1979 was a turning point. Pakistan of Zia was fortunate to receive billions in Western/Arab aid but the long-term impact of the jihadi haven has brought nothing but death, destruction and devastation. During the Cold War, political Islam in its most extreme interpretation was used by NATO and its allies to combat left-wing pro-labor opposition. Narrative focused on conflict between the God-fearing West and the godless Soviets, between good and evil. A scholar summed-up the strategy: "due to its anti-atheistic and pro-capitalist tenets, Islam in general and Saudi Islam (Wahhabism) in particular became an effective tool in US foreign policy in combating pro-Soviet and anti-Western secular and nationalistic ideologies in the Middle East and the Muslim world at large" (Enazy, 2009). As a front-line state

during the most intense and brutal conflict of the Cold War, Pakistan experienced the good (Western/Arab dollars), the bad (terrorism) and the ugly (drugs-weapons) of political Islam in the service of the West.

Congressional Research Service of the U.S. points out that five types of terrorist groups operate from Pakistan: Globally oriented (like Al-Qaeda and Islamic State- Khurasan), Afghanistan-oriented (like the Quetta Shura Taliban and the Haqqani Network), India/Kashmir-oriented (like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad and Harkat ul-Mujahideen), domestically-oriented (like Tahrik-e-Taliban and Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat Mohammedi) and sectarian anti-Shia (like Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) (CRS, 2023). In 1979, the Soviet Army's entry in Afghanistan meant Afghan Mujahedeens were the favorites among jihadis. Pakistan Army's Inter-Service-Intelligence (ISI) had the opportunity to choose the cherished from the carnival of holy warriors. Organizations like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) were treasured by the ISI. Pakistan had its own strategic goals: forging strategic depth in Afghanistan and ensuring the new government of Afghanistan will recognize the Durand Line in accordance with the Rawalpindi Agreement 1919 signed between the British India and Afghanistan governments, thus eliminating the dream of greater Pushtoonistan. The Pushtoon dream has existed since 1893 when Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, foreign secretary of British India, divided the Pushtoon population of Afghanistan with the Durand line. The re-emergence of Taliban power in Kabul since 2021 has made it clear that the idea of Pushtoonistan is alive and thriving in Afghanistan. Even in the first period of Taliban rule from 1996 to 2001, the Kabul regime did not recognize the Durand line. After the Soviet withdrawal in the pre-Taliban period, Pakistani control over Mujahadeens was questionable. As the withdrawal meant a devastating inter-Mujahedeen struggle for power, Pakistan's backing of Hekmatyar did not produce the desired results. Known as 'the butcher of Kabul,' Hekmatyar was instrumental for mounting civilian deaths and decimating the capital- the city known as the Paris of central Asia. The global jihadis did not stop their terrorist activities after the USSR withdrawal or even after its collapse. Simply the targets of death and destruction changed.

A French think tank study covering the period between 1979 and 2019 concluded that more than 33,000 incidents of Islamic terrorism took place at global scale. These incidents caused the death of 167,096 people worldwide. The numbers were highly underreported by various governments. The figures were reported when the full impact of blasts was not even known and injured were still dying. Ultimately the study had to multiply the victims by three to reach a more accurate figure. The year 1979 was chosen as a starting point because of the Iranian revolution, Soviet entry in Afghanistan, Grand Mosque hostage taking and the Islamists response to the Camp David Accord. The think tank also reported that the majority of the victims, more than 91%, of Islamist terrorism were Muslims (Fondapol, 2019). The Islamists claim that jihad is first against 'bad' Muslims and hostile Muslim rulers. The goal is to eliminate 'secular' regimes in Muslim countries and establish a purely Islamic rule. In this respect, some jihadis also consider the Pakistani establishment lacking Islamic credentials and followers of Satan America. The officials in Pakistan do not provide figures of the full impact of terrorism on the soil from 1979 onward. One reason for such a state of affairs is the distinction created by the state between terrorists

considered 'strategic assets' and terrorists working against the interests of Islamabad. Former ambassador of Pakistan to the US writes that such distinction is misleading. "Pakistan officials might make distinction," said the ambassador, "but the militants do not always see things from the same lens. The various groups might disagree over fine points of theology, and over the means and extent of their ideal Islamic state, but they operate in an ecosystem that facilitates cooperation. Individuals often cross over from one group to another and groups transform, mutate, and morph—but their members' commitment to *jihad* endures." (Haqqani, 2023).

A Brooking Institute study points out that the Pakistani state's unwillingness to recognize terror of all jihadi groups is problematic. Groups like Tahrik-e-Taliban Pakistan have been targeted by the security forces while anti-India groups that play proxies for Pakistani military to 'weaken' India through terrorism are encouraged and sponsored by the state (Afzal, 2021). The policy of targeting India has survived among the Mullahs and the Generals since 1947. Leading Islamist anti-India group was founded in British India in 1941- Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). Maudidi, its founder, was an orthodox Sunni Muslim. International Crisis Group (ICG), founded in 1995 in response to horrors of Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia, reported that in many ways the JI is the main architect of Islam in Pakistan. With chapters in Bangladesh and India, it has close ties with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Afzal, 2018). It formed the initial Mullah-Military alliance in Rawalpindi. The Wahabi Islam flourished during General Zia-ul-Haq's rule with Arab money. Under Zia, Islamic education multiplied in Madrassas financed by the Arabs increasing from 900 to over 33,000 (Murphy, 2015: 83). Guided by the colonial era Societies Regulation Acts 1860, the state control over the syllabi is non-existent. Islamic extreme messages, misinterpretation and distortions shape the beliefs, behaviors and values of Madrassa students. Original Taliban fighters were the Talibs (students) of 1980's Wahabi Madrassas established in the Afghan-Pak border area. The system takes the burden of education away from the state. It means more money for the military budget that deprives Pakistanis of all kinds of vital social services. Siding firmly with the West during the Cold War meant raining dollars for the Pakistan military. The direct and indirect political control also gave them a lion's share of the budget. The free market economy of the country also faced competition from the military entrepreneurs such as the Generals' controlled hundred plus businesses, from *Fauji* cement to *Fauji* cereals. An academic expert believes that there are several ways in which the Pakistan military is siphoning both private and public funds including the granting of the most expensive lands to military officers. She estimates that military officers of Pakistan owned seven percent of all private land in the country (Siddiqa, 2016).

As strong civilian institutions like civil bureaucracy and civilian governments failed to function at the national level, the Pakistani military emerged to dominate national politics and national security in the country. In the absence of any checks and balances, the accountability and transparency of the military remains non-existent. Unable to explain the fruitlessness of all wars against India, the ideological camouflage of Islamic theories has remained the only arsenal at its disposal. For internal unity and external challenges, the military does not allow any

internal opposition perspective other than its own religious lobby of Mullahs who are always on the side of the military. Military position was strengthened during the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and the post-9/11 U.S. led wars in the region. The global jihadi presence in Pakistan to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan was a shot in the arm of the Mullah-Military alliance. Soon after the Soviet departure from Afghanistan, thousands of jihadis were available as cannon fodder for the Pakistan military. Indian domestic politics provided strategic and tactical opportunities to the Pakistani army. India's shortsighted games of electoral politics created circumstances for Pakistan to intervene. First it seized the moment provided by the Congress backed Bhindranwale led insurgency in the Indian Punjab. ISI opened terrorist training facilities for Khalistani terrorists and facilitated the cross-border drug-weapon trade. The second opportunity was provided by the Congress-National Conference electoral fraud of 1987 in Kashmir. It led to disturbances in the state. Thousands of jihadis with full terrorist training, armed with radical Islamic ideology and modern weapons moved into the Kashmir valley with Pakistan army help to take advantage of chaos and anarchy. As Kashmiri terrorists concentrated on ethnic cleansing by targeting Valley's Pundits and other Hindus of the state, all officials of state and central government also became the target. The Jammu-Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) kidnapped Rubaiya Sayeed, the daughter of serving Union Home Minister of India, in 1989. The government panicked and released five dreaded terrorists which also set a precedent of a terrorist swap for flight IC 814 hijackers in 1999.

The jihadi narrative is full of utopian vision of paradise for martyrs. It promises a glorious eternal life of guilt-free pleasure in Jannat. They would never look back on earthly life. Life will "launch forward into a new existence beyond anything we have experienced before" (Conrad, 2023). Jihadi brigades are waging a holy war in the name of Islam and Islamic state in Kashmir. In the words of General Pervez Musharraf: "Kashmir runs in our blood. No Pakistani can afford to sever links with Kashmir. The entire Pakistan and the world know this. We will continue to extend our moral, political and diplomatic support to Kashmiris. We will never budge an inch from our principled stand on Kashmir" (Haqqani, 2003). Bangladesh was part of Pakistan and separated yet no one in West Pakistan suggested if Bengal also runs in their blood. Generals have forgotten that the fight for Pakistan was led by East Pakistan Bengali Muslims. Lessons of Bangladesh lead one to believe in the path of peace leading to harmony. Instead of moving ahead with reducing tensions over border issues, the ultra-modern Prime Minister Imran Khan, backed by the Mullah-Military alliance, brought the issue of Junagadh to create more space for martyrdom of jihadi youth. Unable to provide the basic necessities of life to Pakistani youth in this life, the Mullah-Military compact can only generate jihad and rely on the promises of eternal life in jannat.

Pakistan happily participated in anti-Soviet *jihad* of the 1980's and reluctantly participated in the US led anti-Taliban wars of 21st century. The US was frustrated with the Pakistani state's double role. The Taliban, however, was happy that Pakistan allowed them to operate openly with freedoms to organize, rally support, recruit, train and raise funds to buy weapons. Further, they were happy with Islamabad providing official papers for its leadership to travel. The Pentagon knew that safe havens existed for Taliban fighters in Pakistan and the dreaded

Haqqani network responsible for "deaths of US soldiers and destabilization of Afghanistan" (Felbab-Brown, 2018). Despite promoting political Islam in domestic and foreign policy, failures are more visible than success. The great paradox of Pakistan's Islamic republic is that it has hostile relations with Sunni Islamic regime of Kabul to the north and Shia Islamic regime of Tehran to the west while it maintains 'ironclad' relations with communist China accused of interning at least a million Muslims in Chinese camps (Iftikhar, 2019). Prime Minister Imran Khan even pleaded ignorance regarding the plight of the Uighur Muslims. Always trumpeting his Islamic credentials to please his Mullah adherents, Khan could not even comment about the human rights violations of his Chinese Muslim brethren. Fabrications of discrimination against Muslims of India, in general, and Kashmir, in particular, are manufactured and distributed globally by Islamabad. It ignored the media reported incidents of forced pork feeding and alcoholic drinks in addition to torture and mass deaths of Uighur Muslims at the hands of the Chinese officials (Iftikhar, 2019).

The adoption of double standards in everything including terrorists has seriously undermined the credibility of Pakistani establishment. Some terrorists are considered assets of the state and others are considered enemies of the state. This policy has cost dearly to Pakistan. Terrorists move in and out of terrorist organizations driven by self-interest. The intent of all terrorists is to cause maximum destruction of life and property. Creating divisions between the good terrorists and the bad terrorists prompted a warning from the US secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, who stated that "you can't keep snakes in your backyard and expect them to only bite your neighbor" (FP Staff, 2011). Terrorist organizations like the Tahrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the Islamic State of Khurasan Province, the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and its offshoot the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi have created havoc in the country. Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, ambassador Munir Akbar stated that "Pakistan is a victim of terrorism. We have lost 80,000 civilians and soldiers in terrorist attacks. Pakistan's counter terrorism operations since 2014 have cleared our territory of terrorist groups" (Akram, 2021). Just in one year in 2024, Pakistan's national English daily reported 444 terror attacks across country whose ambassador was telling the world body that country was clear of terrorist groups in 2014 (Junaidi, 2024) The Ministry of Finance in Islamabad estimated that Pakistan has lost directly and indirectly some $123 billion because of domestic terrorism. Writing on the inconsistent policy of the state to handle terrorism, an analyst concluded that the domestic terrorist organizations are not even interested in negotiations with the government because they think the regime lacks capacity for a sustained fight (Haqqani, 2023). The reluctance of Pakistan to pursue an anti-terrorist agenda in finances and security has forced the Financial Task Force, a G-7 watchdog to monitor money laundering and financing, placing Pakistan on a "grey list" of countries not fully compliant with regulations (Hussain, 2024). This can impact cross-border transactions, create problems to obtain credit and limit foreign investment.

Enjoying full liberties to recruit, train, finance, plan and execute terrorism, Pakistan based terrorists conducted a vicious attack on Mumbai. While terrorists continued to enjoy full liberties in the country, the Pakistani regime continued the path of misrepresentation at diplomatic levels. The night time amphibious landing of 26

November 2008 proceeded to carry out sophisticated and deadly attacks on several targets in Mumbai. The attacks on Mumbai involved new tactics and new technology designed to inflict maximum damage on the public. The U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs chairman Senator Lieberman told the Senate hearings that upon his visit the authorities in Pakistan assured him their "government has taken steps to crack down on Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), including abiding by the sanctions imposed last December at the United Nations" (U.S. Government Office, 2009). Neither terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba nor terrorists associated with Mumbai attacks faced any legal hurdles in Pakistan despite a US bounty of $10 million on Lashkar-e-Taiba founder Hafiz Muhammad Saeed. He found another front Jama'at-ud-Dawa and continued to receive state patronage (Moore, 2015). In fact, LeT has been on a Foreign Terrorist Organization list of the USA since 2002 along with Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) which was responsible for the attack on Indian Parliament in December 2001. Despite open sponsorship of these terrorist organizations on its soil, Pakistan continued to receive the U.S. aid packages. Pakistan had also denied the whereabouts of Osama Bin Laden until found and executed by the U.S. Marines in Abbottabad in 2011. Despite official support from Islamabad, the U.S. based Pew Research Center polls concluded that the people of Pakistan were sick and tired of chaos and anarchy which resulted in colossal death toll and destruction of life-sustaining infrastructure by terrorist groups. Needless to say, Pew polls showed that Pakistanis are always more unfavorable than favorable towards terrorist groups for both the ones that focus on domestic targets-Tahrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and the ones that target other countries-LeT and Al-Qaeda (Afzal, 2018).

Conclusion

A liberal scholar warns that "we live today amid the dregs of time… The vanishing future is probably the most critical element for the current crisis of democracy" (Krastev, 2024). However, hope of democracy in Pakistan vanished long back with the demise of Muhammad Ali Jinnah in September 1948 and the assassination of country's first Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan in 1951. Democracy with separation of powers has a built-in system of checks and balances to make sure no one branch would be able to control too much power. A well-trained, organized, efficient and highly motivated colonial institution, the military coercive apparatus began monopolizing power as Balochistan and East Pakistan were targeted during Jinnah's tenure. This Punjabi dominated institution developed a close relationship with ecclesiastical authorities. As a result, the Mullah-Military alliance emerged, consolidated and served the needs of both the religious and secular elites of Pakistan. No other institution to hold it accountable, it has used terrorism to exert its hegemony. Terrorism as a strategic and tactical tool in the service of state's domestic and foreign policy is the preferred policy of Pakistan military, its justification in the name of Islam is allocated to the Mullahs. This has created a symbiotic relationship between the Mullahs and the Generals. Absorbing the lion's share of the national budget, the military has neither won any foreign wars nor protected its people from domestic terrorism. This is where religion steps in to serve the existing social hierarchy by ensuring

people accept their fate in this life and look forward to eternal life of happiness by observing concocted stories of religious faith.

While the front-line status of Pakistan during Afghan-Soviet conflict made it an epicenter of global jihadis, the Ghajva-e-Hind call of ani-India jihadis won the heart of Rawalpindi establishment. The process started with the formation of an exclusive Muslim identity of the Indian subcontinent's Islamic community to build a case for "Do Quomi Nazria" for bifurcation. The Pakistani establishment moved forward to build a non-Indian anti-Hindu identity by invoking the names of the invaders. The invention of traditions by focusing on marauders like Muhammad bin Qassim was an attempt to identify Islam's spread in the subcontinent with pillagers. Why did this narrative remain unchallenged at the time? It needs further studies because academics and the vast majority of the subcontinent's Islamic clergy have held the view of Islamic expansion in the subcontinent by the traders and the message of Sufis. By naming missiles after the names of looters like Ghaznvi, Gauri and Abdali, the Rawalpindi establishment has conveyed national pride in the obliteration of India. It is this adverse view that is responsible for unleashing havoc against Hindus of India in Kashmir or Mumbai. From Soviet-Afghan wars to the US-Afghan wars, the devastation of the subcontinent has been without parallel. While the Islamabad establishment made billions, the people of India and Pakistan have suffered from terrorist attacks and flooding of the region with deadly weapons and dangerous drugs. Further research is needed to understand the origins, development and the all-sided impact of brutal terrorism, narcotic drugs and deadly weapons trade on the people of both sides of the Indo-Pak border.

During the Cold War and the post-Cold War period, the single-minded focus of the United States on attaining the role of the global gendarme in a unipolar world exerted pressure on its foreign policy to tolerate authoritarian-military juntas around the world. It became apparent that the Department of State and the Pentagon preferred to deal with Pinochets than Allendes of the world. Pakistan was no exception to the rule. Even civilian leaders like Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan are the product of the Generals. Same civilian leadership serving in the state institutions is then labelled as incompetent and corrupt by the army. In any scenario, only the military actions in Pakistan are not subject to any checks and balances. The Mullah-Military consortium strategy of terrorism and the religious sanctions to justify this vicious violence remains unchallenged. Terrorism has become part of normal life in this unholy compact. Even the imagination of Generals is hostage to the world of terror. For instance, the Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) led by the Chief Executive Officer Air Vice Marshal (AVM) Muhammad Amir Hayat approved an advertisement showing the PIA plane flying toward the Eiffel tower. The Ad to promote PIA's direct flight to Paris reminded people of 9/11 planes approaching the trade towers in New York. The sensations and feelings of the Military officer, who leads the PIA, were captured by the imagination of terrorist strategy pursued by the Pakistani military. He could not detect what image the ad was portraying? Since terrorism has become part of the value system of the Mullah-Military regime, it will not vanish from the strategy and tactics of the Pakistani establishment.

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